Agency theory, game theory and problem of state capital representatives in state-owned enterprises

  • TRẦN VIỆT LÂM

Abstract

    State-owned enterprises play a vital role in the socialist-oriented market economy. Nevertheless, there is a fact that numerous state-owned enterprises operate with low efficiency resulting in capital losses. This fact raises the question whether the responsibility is of the state capital representatives or the owner's representatives. It is extremely complicated to determine the responsibilities of individuals. Therefore, there is a need to solve the problem of the state capital representatives. Due to the imperfect and asymmetry information between the principal and the agent, the existence of agency costs are inevitable. Derived from the conclusions of the agency theory and the game theory, this article proposes initial principles to reduce the agency costs and to determine the responsibilities of the agent representing the state capital for production and business activities of the enterprises. Concerning restructuring state-owned enterprises, there are a lot of contents considered necessary but definitely one of the most significant one is selection of state capital representatives.     
điểm /   đánh giá
Published
2017-11-17
Section
NGHIÊN CỨU - TRAO ĐỔI