

## Hợp tác kinh tế giữa Việt Nam Cộng hòa và Đại Hàn Dân Quốc (1965 - 1975)

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### TÓM TẮT

Bài báo nghiên cứu này nhằm mục đích làm rõ mối quan hệ kinh tế giữa Việt Nam Cộng hòa (VNCH) và Đại Hàn Dân Quốc (Hàn Quốc) trong giai đoạn 1965 - 1975. Tác giả đã sử dụng phương pháp luận sử học, cùng với việc tham khảo tài liệu nghiên cứu bậc hai để chứng minh rằng quan hệ kinh tế giữa Việt Nam và Hàn Quốc là một lĩnh vực của quan hệ ngoại giao song phương và chiến tranh là một yếu tố khuyến khích quan hệ kinh tế trở nên vững chắc hơn. Trong khi VNCH phụ thuộc vào viện trợ của Hàn Quốc để chống lại các cuộc tấn công của những người Cộng sản cũng như tái thiết nền kinh tế quốc gia sau chiến tranh, thì Hàn Quốc đầu tư vào thị trường của VNCH để hưởng lợi từ viện trợ của Hoa Kỳ và thị trường thương mại tự do của VNCH cho tiêu dùng hàng hóa của Hàn Quốc. Sau khi Đồng minh rút quân, VNCH và Hàn Quốc vẫn giữ mối quan hệ kinh tế để Hàn Quốc có thể thay thế vai trò của Hoa Kỳ ở Đông Nam Á cũng như giúp bảo vệ VNCH khỏi chủ nghĩa Cộng sản, được cho là sẽ thay đổi kinh tế miền Nam sau khi VNCH sụp đổ vào năm 1975.

**Từ khóa:** Việt Nam Cộng hòa, Đại Hàn Dân Quốc, chiến tranh Việt Nam, chiến tranh Lạnh, hợp tác kinh tế.

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# Republic of Vietnam and Republic of Korea: Economic Cooperation in the period of 1965 - 1975

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## ABSTRACT

The task of this research article is to shed light on the Republic of Vietnam (RVN/ South Vietnam) - the Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) economic ties from 1965 to 1975. The author employed the methodology of historiography, including a historical documentary approach, along with desk-research paper reference to acknowledge that the economic relation is a realm of bilateral diplomatic relations and the war is a key factor to give a heavy impulse to economic ties. While South Vietnam was subjected to South Korea's aid to repulse the attacks of Communists as well as revitalize the national economy after the war, the South Korean government also engaged in South Vietnam's market and benefited from the US aid and free trade market for South Korea's commodity consumption. After the removal of Allied troops, South Vietnam and South Korea remained its economic ties to supersede the role of the US in Southeast Asia as well as safeguard South Vietnam from Communism, which would make a seismic change in the economy in this country subsequent to the Fall of Saigon in 1975.

**Keywords:** *The Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, economic cooperation.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Cold War is not only a stage of conflict, but it facilitates trends of cooperation. Asia became a center of contradicting interests between the US and the Soviet Union and evidently, Korean War and the Vietnam War are two typical examples of the Cold War in Asia. In Vietnam, the explosion of the Vietnam War in the 1960s and its escalation in 1965 proved that the dog-eat-dog war reached its peak, and the US and alliances showed determination to suppress the uprisings of Communism. Receiving help from warm ties with Asian Pacific Ocean countries,

America embroiled South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in the Vietnam War. While a handful of literature reveals the fact of military cooperation in this conflict, other aspects of cooperation earned a modicum of scholarly attraction. It would be inadequate to state that America and its allies only focused on the escalation of the war while the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter RVN/ South Vietnam) was an inactive government. In contrast, the government of Thieu concurrently made a strenuous attempt to take advantage of allies to establish economic ties and build

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democracy in the south. Alongside the warmest relationship with the US, the RVN government respected the succor of the ROK, which shared a lot of political and historical similarities during the Cold War.

It seems to be plausible to argue that the American element played a significant role in emboldening the commitment of the ROK on South Vietnam battlefields. The First ROK of Syngman Rhee primarily depended on the aid of America to counter the heavy influence of Japan after the Second World War while implementing

a rigorous policy to spurn all attacks on North Korean Communists and guarantee national security.<sup>1</sup> Under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, both the economic and military power of the ROK was strongly subjected to the US aid packages. The dearth of natural resources together with the juggernaut of the Korean War gravely weakened the national economy of South Korea. The supreme objective of South Korea was to have a recourse to US aid to realize anticommunism policy and support non-communist countries in the world.

**Table 1.** United States’ aid for the Republic of Korea between 1946 and 1976 (Unit: US million).<sup>2</sup>

	1946 - 52	1953 - 61	1962 - 69	1970 - 76	Total
Economic aid	666.8 (98%)	2,579.2 (62%)	1,658.2 (40%)	963.6 (25%)	5,745.4 (46%)
Military aid	12.3 (2%)	1,560.7 (38%)	2,501.3 (60%)	2,797.4 (75%)	6,847.3 (54%)
Total	679.1 (100%)	4,139.9 (100%)	4,159.5 (100%)	3,761.0 (100%)	12,592.7 (100%)

Table 1 illustrates a surge of the US aid for South Korea from 1946 to 1976. It is indiscernible that the number of economic aid and military aid had a sharp increase after 30 years. This statistic only decreased under the presidency of Park Chung Hee. A self-made country was a simmering dream of Park to revive South Korea and he was willing to greatly benefit from any external factors to effectively rebound South Korea’s economy. Park navigated his policy to churn the US’s aid into a repercussion of the potential market for South Korea’s export in place of relying on a wealthy supporter to retain an economic bureaucracy. Meanwhile, riveting amity with the US to engender a sense of the closest alliance was conducive to the development of the ROK. Seeing points of weakness in the Vietnam War, Park dragooned his army into scaling up in the Vietnam War with the hope of enriching the national budget via civilian constructs and modernizing the performance of the ROK Army.<sup>3</sup> It was significant to seek a potential targeting market like South Vietnam to shape economic ties, so South Vietnam and South Korea made a synergy of economic cooperation. Evidently, the government of Park earned 40%

foreign currency income from the Vietnam War and approximately one billion US dollars from 1965 to 1972.<sup>3</sup> This was a driving force to design the economic plans of Park in domestic South Korea. In one word, South Vietnam was both a critical factor to solidify the relationship of South Korea with the US and it was expected to become a targeting market of South Korea’s market in the strategic scheme of industrialization.

However, the engagement of South Korea in the Vietnam War opened a bright vista for the America-South Korea alliance. According to statistics, this relationship was more deeply reinforced on account of the mobilization of South Korea’s military, which can be judged to be diplomatic leverage to reach a consensus with the US to build the national economic well-being of South Korea. Park Chung Hee endorsed joining 67 international organizations, mentioned diplomatic affairs in 348 papers, 137 foreign policies of the government, and had at least 47 policies of trade exchanges.<sup>4</sup> As for the US, South Korea was an influential figure to show dissident actions toward Communism in the Soviet Union, North Korea, and mainland China.

Also, the South Vietnam government was in hours of need in its relationship with the US. Communists absolutely dominated over the North Vietnam territories originating from the debacle of France in Dien Bien Phu in 1954 making a tough leadership for the US in Southeast Asia. In an attempt to contain Communism and intercept the expansionist goal of Communism in Southeast Asia, the US advocated Ngo Dinh Diem's presidency and assisted the South Vietnamese people to establish the Republic of Vietnam in 1955. The capitalism-oriented direction of South Vietnam's economy paved the way for capitalism growth, which had a fundamental prerequisite in the south under the State of Vietnam. Even if the economic condition of Vietnam's capitalism was insufficient to turn South Vietnam into a developed country, the paradigm of a market-based economy stimulated the freedom of commerce, goods, and labor forces. The diplomatic recognition of capitalist countries in the world was a corollary of South Vietnam's economy thanks to a wide range of bilateral and multilateral economic agreements. During the pristineness of embryonic government, South Vietnam was an ample receiver of US aid, the amount of US aid was synonymous with a higher level of the Vietnam War. The number gained 233 million dollars in 1955 and rose to 550 million dollars in 1969 and US aid was a major source of South Vietnam's export, accounting for 69,54% in the period of 1971 - 1975.<sup>5</sup> The protégé of the US government ultimately linked the US objectives to contain Communism in Vietnam, yet the government of South Vietnam was active to seek a path for national economy development via other partners. As opposed to South Korea, the Vietnam War challenged the attempts of South Vietnamese politicians to shape a concrete economic development plan to industrialize and modernize the national economy. Communists plagued South Vietnamese politicians with their attacks, and it can be seen as a key touchstone to shatter dreams of launching a perfect policy for the economy when national security had

to be fundamentally safeguarded. As for South Vietnam, South Korea also functioned anticommunism plan and was a compadre to shoulder to shoulder with the US in this objective. The willingness of South Korean economists to assert a mutual belief in economic development illustrated that there was a clash of interests between South Vietnam and South Korea. As mentioned, South Korea employed South Vietnam's market to boost the value of export and earn bounteous aid of the US while South Vietnam deemed South Korea as one corner of South Vietnam – US – South Korea triangular relationship to realize anticommunism policy and reap benefits from economic assistance of South Korea.

In a nutshell, South Vietnam and South Korea shared a lot of analogies in economic growth. Both countries took advantage of the US aid in a anti-communism struggles. The mechanism of capitalism encouraged growth in the fields of the economy and attracted foreign investment.<sup>6</sup> This relationship can be examined by Realism in the Cold War. Realists argued that states were challenging to seek a path of effortless cooperation in the world of competition in case they found nothing in that tie.<sup>7</sup> Realism suggests that all leaders, no matter what their political persuasion, recognized this as they attempted to manage their state's affairs in order to survive in a competitive environment.<sup>8</sup> Foreign policies can be viewed as an vital factor that was instrumental in making the decision to gain national interests in a byzantine context of international relations. Resultantly, foreign policies of all countries over the course of the Cold War implied that security affairs ranked a priority position to reciprocally curb the power in a bipolar world. Besides, all states viewed international relations as a mechanism of power-seeking as evidence of rationality and they poised on the achievement of power via the intensity of war in place of peace talks and cooperation trend. Peace was still likely to be gained through the management of degree of war.

In this case study, both governments of RVN and ROK saw points of economic cooperation to locate this facet in their foreign policies. It can be seen that South Korea and South Vietnam made an attempt to search for their power in the economy as a key notion of Capitalism through reinforcing politically strategic alliance relationships and the deeper military involvement of South Korea was concurrent with the higher levels of its economic cooperation with the government of South Vietnam. South Vietnam and South Korea were imperative partners of the Capitalism world, which Realists explained that the international system was anarchic since interstate mechanisms would be established to have a penchant for unipolarity<sup>7</sup> and in this sense, international relations were split into two polars. The ultimate goal of South Vietnam and South Korea was the deepest engagement of them with the US and the Free World to crush the burgeoning of Communism. As a result, a sense of military power was still a major point of cooperation albeit a sense of economic cooperation heralded goodwill of peace to reach the objective of Communism containment in lieu of a war-based sphere. This statement became more transparent once we saw the progress of economic cooperation of the RVN after the pullout of American troops and allies.

Jumping back to South Vietnam-South Korea economic cooperation, the Vietnam War admittedly created an economic anomaly in South Vietnam's capitalism. The huge allocation of the US in the war to earn a decisive triumph over Communism in Vietnam crippled prospects of long-term economic plans and made the economic distribution of the national economy unbalanced. This peculiarity was antonymous to South Korea, which had a splendid chance to identify several external factors to reinforce internal power owing to peace. Although being heavily subjected to US aid, RVN also made an endeavor to probe foreign support, which was able to eliminate the burden of US aid. This objective became transparent in subsequent

years of the Vietnam War when the US troop withdrew from South Vietnam, RVN strived to design a solid economic policy for a post-war time through tightening bilateral cooperation and improving good neighborly relations with Southeast Asian countries. ROK is regarded to be one of the countries, which was able to both assist South Vietnam to rebuff all uprisings of Communists and guarantee economic benefits to South Vietnam through economic cooperation. Compared to the RVN, ROK stepped out of the civil war with North Korea and put stress on five-year economic development plans. As a result, the investment of the ROK marked the genesis of the economic cooperation of RVN with foreign countries through sharing mutual interests in building a non-communist world.

Summing up these contexts of the two countries, this article aims to prove that the involvement of South Korea in the Vietnam War was beyond military help, which collectively experienced a misconception in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was not only a clear opportunity for South Korea to receive a huge investment from the US, but it was capable of profiting from the free trade of South Vietnam to engender a long-term economic influence and it is evident that that economic tie still remained unaffected after the pulling-out of South Korean troops in 1973.

## 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article employs a historical sciences approach with the key role of source materials at National Archives Center II in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam to interpret South Vietnam – South Korea economic cooperation from 1965 to 1975. Documents were thoroughly classified into two collections, including a collection of the President of the second Republic of Vietnam (DIICH) and collections of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam (PTTg). Timeframe of documents runs from 1965 to 1975. It means it started from the inception of Korean Army involvement in 1965 to the Fall of Saigon in 1975. Owing to being directly archived by the RVN staff, this



source can be seen as original to depend on in this paper. Documents have a rich content of bilateral talks and agreements between the RVN and the ROK, including Vietnamese-based docs and English docs. Besides, the former regime staff recorded some excerpts from newspapers to update those meetings and this source is reliable to be referenced throughout author's arguments and analysis. After being skimmed and evaluated by the author, it is clear that South Vietnam's interests in economic relations with South Korea were beneficial to the thriving economy of South Vietnam and the economy was a key field of bilateral cooperation for diplomatically moving up the ladder.

Also, the author approached secondary sources via a wide range of desk research papers directly related to this topic to solidify all statements throughout the paper. These papers illuminated some relevant topics, consisting of the US – South Korea relationship, and the US - South Vietnam relationship, and left some evaluations of diplomatic policy and their outcomes.

Besides, the logical method was conducive to identifying a chronological process of South Vietnam – South Korea economic ties and its essences sprung from the national interests of both governments. This method also helped assess the pros and cons of South Vietnam – South Korea economic links and their effects on the national interests of South Vietnam and South Korea. The comparative method also assisted the author to assess involving factors to distinguish analogies and dissimilarities in the Vietnam War, which directly influenced South Vietnam – South Korea economic ties.

### 3. RESULTS

#### 3.1. Economic cooperation rises to serve the war (1965 - 1968)

Economic ties between RVN and ROK sprung from the First Republic of Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem and Rhee Syngman cozily established a warm relationship that mutually depended on

anti-communism goals and shared historical backgrounds. The signed Treaty of Trade Relations between the two countries marked the starting point of economic relations in 1957.<sup>9</sup> While the national economy stagnated in this period, the Korean economy during the Vietnam War underwent an upward trend due to the participation of South Korea in the Vietnam War since the US alleged that it would increase the aid for the ROK once this country ardently joined the Vietnam War.<sup>10</sup> The first deployment of South Korean troops escorted to South Vietnam on July 31, 1964, and then, the so-called "Dove Unit" voyaged to South Vietnam in February 1965 contributed to helping South Vietnamese troops to defend the country from Communists.<sup>11</sup>

However, this study does not scrutinize the role of South Korean troops in South Vietnam. While participating in the war, South Vietnamese politicians in Phan Huy Quat's government also stressed the role of South Korea to reinforce the wartime economy of South Vietnam. In 1965, the RVN in collaboration with the ROK organized a conference between the Economic Minister of the RVN and the ROK's concerning economic relations between the two countries. The conference was led by the RVN Minister of Economy and Finance Truong Thai Ton and the ROK Minister of Economic Planning Board Key Yong Chang and Minister of Commerce and Industry Choong Hoon Park, Minister without Portfolio Yong Suk Won, representing the Government of the ROK in Seoul, South Korea on November 11, 1965. The objectives of this event primarily concentrated on five points, including strengthening of mutual economic relations, promotion of trade, technical cooperation, cooperation in the rear-area projects in Vietnam and other economic relations. In this event, Ton aimed to make a concerted effort with the ROK to strengthen the economic relations between the two countries, both parties exchanged viewpoints on the economic conditions of both countries, present and future, which counted on kicking off annual conferences on a ministerial level to broach mutual economic questions

and augmenting the number of mutual visits of government officials concerned with economic affairs. Also, the RVN had a desire to facilitate the establishment of a private organization such as the Korea-Vietnam businessmen's association.<sup>12</sup> As for the RVN, this point was significant to fuel mutual belief between the RVN and the ROK not only in the military cooperation section to hamper Communism in the south, yet economic section correspondingly laid in the centrality of the RVN foreign policy to enhance the internal power of the RVN. As for South Korea, the involvement of this country in Vietnam stems from the economic interests it probably gained to stimulate its national economy. In this proclamation, Nguyen Thi Thu Nguyet made a conclusion that the significance of the US played a considerable role in creating economic leverage on South Korea and minimizing the ROK military expense to stay focused on independent economic development.<sup>13</sup> Since the Cold War, the policies of the ROK inflated the importance of the alliance with the US. Under the assistance of the ROK, the US would be able to gain its tactical goal of Asia - the Pacific Ocean and the political sphere of this region. During the phase of the Cold War, the ROK laid at the centrality of the US policy in East Asia, which militated against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Soviet Union from the north, potential risks to the People Republic of China (PRC) from the west, and Japan from the east. Moreover, Park Chung Hee was ambitious to take advantage of the free market of South Vietnam to underline the role of trade. As a result, the ROK closely discussed with the RVN in this seminar to grant preferential treatment in the issuance of import licenses on goods arising from both countries and further reiterate inflated the importance of Korea from Vietnam to station a Vietnamese trade representative in Seoul, South Korea.

In the political climate of the Vietnam War, issues of technical support and cooperation still played a considerable role in the further economic policy of the RVN. In the 1965

economic conference, Ton underscored that technical cooperation was crucial to step up with South Korea, where the first industrialization process in the first five-year economic plan had a fruit of achievements in 1965. Two countries tended to utilize, whenever possible, Korean technical experts in programs financed by the United States Aid Fund.<sup>14</sup> With the hope of enhancing technical cooperation, the ROK government continued to convene with the RVN in a conference from December 27 to December 29, 1965. The program of the visit by the Korea Economic Mission to South Vietnam tackled mutual cooperation in technical development. Jwah Kym Kim led the South Korean delegation, which included Sang Jin Chyun - Director of Economic Affairs Bureau, Yun Se Yang - Chief of Overall Program Division, Economic Planning, Mr. Jy Sang Mun - Chief of Export Promotion Division, Won Ho Lee - Second Secretary Economic Section, Korean Embassy in Saigon, and Mr. In Sung Wang - Director of Korea Trade Center. Two parties fundamentally concentrated on four affairs, consisting of the mutual exchange of technical instructors and trainers, the implementation of dispatching a civilian medical team to Vietnam, the development of telecommunications and power plant operations, and agricultural development. The ROK delegate was keen on stressing the necessity of rising items of import and export between the two countries, while the RVN enthused to entrust a Vietnamese trade representative in Seoul to maintain the MAP off-shore procurement and processing of commodities under PL-480.<sup>15</sup> It is evident that the RVN had an overriding desire to elevate its economic relation with South Korea and diplomatic symbol was critical to building bilateral mutual trust. Meanwhile, the expectation of South Korea exceeded the possibility of political intentions, which had to be destined for its economic benefits in South Vietnam's market with a principal element of export value. The RVN government was determined to facilitate the ROK to join the rear-area construction works in Vietnam and approved of dispatches of

the civilian medical team to Vietnam. Ton also floated the idea that the ROK would establish a branch office of the Bank of Korea in Vietnam and spur huge allocations into the RVN to shape a legal framework for bilateral cooperation. It is implied that economic cooperation with the South Korean government would weather the economic predicaments of the government to both compete against Communists and fashion a developing country. The prolonged tension of political turmoil, along with a necessity of internal force in an attempt to suppress the uprisings of Communists featured the government of Nguyen Van Thieu supporting external aid package attraction to rebuild the country.

ROK and RVN economic delegates continually reviewed a wide range of economic cooperation in the second session of the bilateral meeting in Saigon in early 1966. In January 1966, Korean Deputy Prime Minister Key Young Chang arrived in Saigon to discuss the implementation of measures for strengthening economic relations between the two nations, which would in turn strengthen their mutual anti-Communist posture.<sup>11</sup> Alongside Chang, he was escorted by five members of the party, including Yong Suk Won - Minister without portfolio, Chung Yum Kim - vice Minister, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Sang In Chyun, Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yonsae Yang, Chief of Overall Program Division Economic Planning Bureau, Ministry of Economic Planning Board, and Ki Byung Kim - Secretary to the Deputy Premier. In an assessment of the current situation of South Vietnam - South Korea ties, Chang stated that it was crucial to rivet South Vietnam - South Korea economic ties in order to expand the reciprocal effort in reshaping an administration of capitalism in Asia. This statement divulged expectations of South Korea toward RVN consisting of economic elements to serve the economic well-being of South Korean growth. Unlike the US, South Korea joined the Vietnam War not only the rise of Communists but because it sought a potential market in Southeast Asia to

aim at the freedom of navigation and stimulated the increase of export values. In this session, Chang heightened the importance of economic cooperation between South Vietnam and South Korea and implied an accentuation of economic cooperation would patronize the government of South Vietnam to be triumphant over the Communists.<sup>16</sup> Chang fueled his belief in this tie being able to build economic development plan for South Vietnam as the two countries shared natural and historical conditions. The speech of Chang gave recognition to South Vietnam - South Korea ties in economy and proposed a suggestion to South Vietnamese economists to distribute their time into the economic development plan.

From January 10 to January 15, 1966, two parties continued to convene in Saigon to rapport with each other in economic ties. In this meeting, South Vietnamese economists ensured that the South Vietnam government would give preferential consideration to Korean still working whenever needs arise. South Vietnamese economists considered skilled labor forces as one of the key elements of economic cooperation, which embroiled several Korean workers to reinforce the economic thriving of South Vietnam. Also, this tie was likely to meet the need for skilled workers in South Vietnam on-the-job training could be provided by South Korean instructors and trainers to South Vietnamese workers. Simultaneously, the South Vietnam government made the main thrust in an exchange of technical know-how including mutual visits was advantageous to both countries.<sup>17</sup> South Korea was able to put some articles of agreement on the role of coastal transportation, port operation, power system, telecommunication, and construction in this conference since these fields had an abundance of potential to push the values of export of South Korea ahead. According to the head of the South Korean delegate, Chang summarized the main achievements of this tie and drew two points, namely, export value and skilled labor. Chang appreciated a wide range of exchanges in medical service, commercial values, civilian support,



and agricultural cooperation.<sup>16</sup> It is indubitable that South Korean economists had a forensic examination of South Vietnam's market and the engagement of South Korea in the Vietnam War was deemed to be the reason why the US was not a sole factor in this conflict. Besides benefits gained from the US, the South Korean government circulated its advantages in this war in order to realize its economic development plan under the presidency of Park Chung Hee.

In reaction to the speech of Chang, Nguyen Hoang Chuong - South Vietnamese Special Assistant for Commerce, Ministry of National Economy in consultation with Jwah Kyum Kim - the ROK Minister of Economic Affairs of the Korean Embassy in Saigon and Director of Korean Economic Coordination Group in Vietnam reached a consensus to promote an exchange of visits and technical know-how in the field of port construction, diesel engine maintenance, installation, and small power generators and more positive actions. These aid packages were conducive to the national economy of the RVN. In a situation of anticommunism containment, economic tie, though perennial, also spur the targeting of the country's economy and set up the initial stage of the post-war program once the level of war was mitigated. Record of Discussions in captured archival docs showed that both governments would continue to grant preferential treatment in the issuance of imports and export. Also, private joint ventures in rear area construction to strengthen military efforts and other industrial areas to attain closer economic relations between the two countries lay in the supremacy of economic cooperation. The visits of South Korean and South Vietnamese experts, technicians, businessmen, industrialists, and government officials would rivet bilateral liaison to make economic leverage. Two governments intended to take action of building an honored warehouse in Quy Nhon to be started in April 1966 along with some dispatches of South Korean experts to South Vietnam in that year. Additionally, the South Korean government urged the South

Vietnam government to establish a Korea-Vietnam Businessman's Association, and this proposal furnished economic ties between the two countries via people-to-people diplomacy. Annual negotiations also contributed to deepening bilateral talks and showing a cohesion of alliance in the Vietnam War.<sup>18</sup> An uptick in economic ties was obviously substantial to the national revival of South Vietnam subsequent to years of political upheavals and rapidly expanded war due to the uprising of Communists. South Vietnamese economists made a proper consideration of this tie, which was beneficial to the future of the RVN in political chaos to contain Communism. South Korean politicians recommended implementing a two-target development program for South Vietnam, including military cooperation along with economic development. It unveils that the government of Thieu-Ky did not stand still to swallow foreign aid and it sought true peace via collaborative means to both blight the prospect of Communists and would clear the path of national development. Also, this session solidified the South Vietnam - South Korean relationship in resiliently fighting back against Communists.

While taking care of alienable elements to quell insurgencies of Communists, South Vietnamese politicians shared a common goal with South Korea to make a strenuous attempt to build economic infrastructure for a long-term confrontation with North Vietnam. At this conference, there were 18 members of the Vietnamese delegation joined. Tran Van Kien - Finance Secretary, Deputy Chief Delegate, along with Le Van Kim - Director of Research and Planning, Ministry of National Economy Coordinator, and Pham Huu Vinh - ranking officials from the Public Works and Communications, Nguyen Le Giang - the Labor Department, Director of Cabinet and Nguyen Van An - the Agriculture Department, Director of Cabinet. With the purpose of pushing the national economy ahead, RVN delegates underscored three aspects of bilateral economic tie being composed of technical

cooperation and assistance, trade promotion, port operations assistance, communications, and telecommunication. Through these projects, South Vietnam economists convinced South Korea to offer a well-qualified staff to assist South Vietnamese experts to construct public works, communications, agriculture, and health.<sup>11</sup> South Vietnam had the depth of long-established agriculture thanks to the aegis of nature. The fertility of land and benign climate were critical factors to translate the Mekong Delta into a potential market of agriculture for foreign investments from the perspective of regionalism. Meanwhile, the South Korean government put a trial for the 1970 Saemaul Undong, which impersonated a rational renovation of South Korea's agriculture and was a glaring illustration for this point. As a result, the aid of South Korea for the agricultural development of South Vietnam was especially beneficial to consult with the government to draft an interim policy to restrain Communism-based agricultural policy and win the heart and minds of South Vietnamese peasants.

Besides, ROK delegates put stress on trade encouragement in South Vietnam's market. On December 17, 1958, the Treaty of Trade Relations between the two countries was signed, which made room for trade relations between South Vietnam and South Korea to be in progress in the subsequent years.<sup>9</sup> In 1964, President Park Chung Hae accentuated the role of an export-based economy, which is supposed to make a breakthrough for South Korea's economy. Park stated that it went without saying that the top task to form the foundation of such a self-made economy is to acquire foreign currency through export promotion with the purpose of saving, making more, and earning a lot of money.<sup>19</sup> Resultantly, this direction led South Korea's economy to the promotion of export and the expansionist goal of trade market southward. According to the statistic of the 1966 conference, Korean exported to South Vietnam approximately \$115 million worth of goods mostly steel products (round bars, wire rods, iron

sheets, and engines- generators, marine engines, waving machines).<sup>11</sup> These kinds of goods are the results of the industrialization policy of Park Chung Hee and the trade exchanges and export are considered to be an economic driving force to partially make the Han River Miracle.

**Table 2.** 1961-1966 Korea-South Vietnam imports and exports (Unit: dollar)<sup>19</sup>

Year	Korea's exports (To the market of RVN)	Exports of the RVN (To the Korean market)
1961	152,892	0
1962	700,486	0
1963	13,449,999	1,204,054
1964	7,037,977	0
1965	18,244,082	58
1966	8,778,582	97,725

Table 2 deprived of the 대한뉴스 (Korean News) in 1968 and illustrates the fact of economic cooperation between South Vietnam and South Korea. While South Vietnam showed its hesitancy throughout import and export cooperation owing to a dearth of export-based economy strategy together with domestic fatigue of kakistocracy (1963 - 1967),<sup>a</sup> South Korea gave a rise to the trade market with South Korea. If the value gained \$152,892 million, it accrued in 1966 and peaked at \$8,778,582 million. It is stated that South Korea respected South Vietnam's market and targeted the destination of South

<sup>a</sup> The First Republic of South Vietnam (1955 - 1963) confronted some coup d'état originating from irritation of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, respectively 1960, 1962, and 1963. The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown by the ARVN on Nov. 1<sup>st</sup>, 1963, under the aegis of the US government. From 1963 - 1965, the anarchic situation remained in South Vietnam, leading to another 14-coup d'état. It was not until 1965, the National Leadership Committee was established, the political sphere in South Vietnam temporarily stabilized and economic strategies had an inception of recovery after the formation of the Second Republic of Vietnam under the presidency of Nguyen Van Thieu (1967 - 1975).

Korea's goods as a developing market, which would become a potential marketplace once South Vietnam - South Korea relations achieved a deeper level of all aspects of cooperation in the following years of the war.

Although the activities of trade in South Vietnam demonstrated volatility in this period owing to the war, Vietnamese export items to Korea so far is rice which stood at 515,000 tons in 1965.<sup>11</sup> Rice exports by Vietnam ceased in 1964 and resumed in 1965 and Vietnam also imported the staple food from the United States and Thailand. The import items of South Korea from Vietnam diversified in 1965 with a wide range of scrap iron, crude rubber, coconut oil, and silicon sand. Thereby, South Korea was one of the target markets for South Vietnam to export rice, which is a strength of South Vietnam's economy. Although the number of container ships was deficient to afford South Korea's imports, South Vietnam made a continued effort to maintain two-sided commercial links and it plays a considerable role in stimulating the dynamic development of the national economy. In an attempt to assist South Vietnam to facilitate freedom of navigation as long as an easy flow of Korean goods, South Korea solicited to build a system of ports by allocating Korean investments into building large ports in Saigon and other coastal provinces of South Vietnam.

At the second session of the RVN-ROK Economic Cooperation Conference, Truong Thai Ton - Minister of National Economy and Finance of RVN and Key Young Chang, Yong Suk Won heled another panel in Saigon from January 11<sup>th</sup> to January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1966 with the view of further economic collaboration. Import and export licenses on goods originating in both countries ranked the top policy to gain a deeper involvement in bilateral trade.<sup>20</sup> Besides, South Korea mentioned the role of skilled workers in Vietnam's market at this session and the South Vietnam side proclaimed that South Vietnam would offer a preferential consideration for South Korean skilled workers to be entitled to their profession in Vietnam. Asan Social Welfare

Foundation (1988) uncovers that more than 70% of the Korean labor force was exported to South Vietnam, and they were dispatched through these Korean companies. The remaining 30% of Korean workers or technicians were dispatched through American companies that entered the South Vietnamese market.<sup>19</sup> It is stated that South Vietnam was a buoyant market to help South Korean workers be promoted in their skills and contributed to the economic growth of South Korea and capitalize on the market economy of South Vietnam.

When the war in Vietnam became more severe, economic ties between RVN and ROK were remarked by bilateral economic agreements. On January 16, 1967, RVN endorsed an Agreement to waive complaints and claim compensation for soldiers of the ROK 1967. Then, RVN continued to sign with the ROK concerning temporarily imported goods at South Vietnam's storage on October 4, 1967. During 1967 - 1968, South Vietnam imported steel, iron, seeds, fresh fruits, herb, and hair dye from South Korea. The values of these goods are illustrated below.

**Table 3.** Values of South Korean goods imported to RVN in 1967 (Unit: South Vietnam dong)<sup>21</sup>

Commodities	Values
Plants, seeds, medicine	24.000.000
Herb and hair and skin dye	19.000.000
Cement	19.000.000
Metal	172.000.000

It is conspicuous that metal was the major good to be imported into South Vietnam with a value gained 172 VND million in 1967. While plants, seeds, and medicine were important to improve the production and quality of agricultural products, herbs, dye, and cement create a large consumption market in South Vietnam during wartime.

Besides, South Vietnam in consultation with South Korea to take all necessary actions to the establishment of a branch office of the Bank of Korea in Saigon by the last of March 1966.

Table 4. Trade bank system in some selected countries<sup>5</sup>

Nation	Number of banks		Total branches		Number of holders for each branch	
	1967	1970	1967	1970	1967	1970
South Vietnam	21	28	38	73	420	237.000
Taiwan	17	-	306	-	43	-
South Korea	17	-	236	-	122	-
Pakistan	25	-	1747	-	62	-
Thailand	27	-	324	-	96	-
Philippines	37	-	188	-	175	-

Table 4 was withdrawn from the work of Vo Van Sen related to the increase of Capitalism in South Vietnam. It can be seen that the number of Korean banks in South Vietnam was 17 and it opened 236 branches in RVN in 1967. Despite a modest number compared to other countries, Korean banks in South Vietnam satisfied the needs of RVN regarding import and export exchanges with the ROK in the contour of severe war from 1965 to 1968. It is proof of bilateral financial commitment between two countries in the field of economy. Also, commodities of South Korea had a rewarding chance to be tapped into and consumed in South Vietnam’s market and met the needs of South Korean forces garrisoned in foreign military bases in this country.

Broadly speaking, the period of 1965 - 1968 eye was the dynamic development of RVN-ROK economic cooperation due to the involvement of South Korea’s military forces in the Vietnam War. The tactical presence of South Korea in South Vietnam results in an opener investment of South Korea in South Vietnam to afford the financial affairs of South Korean soldiers in their war in Vietnam. Accordingly, the South Korean government significantly benefited from US aid with its participation in the Vietnam War. On the other hand, South Korea has two huge advantages in this struggle. First, South Korea’s economic well-being was bolstered by US aid. Second, South Korea sought a close market to export its commodities

for consumption. The embryonic capitalism market of South Vietnam, along with the fierce war context hampered export activities, so the export value of South Vietnam was inferior to South Korea’s market.

3.2. Economic cooperation for post-war plans of South Vietnam and deeper economic involvement of South Korea (1969 - 1975)

Vietnamization marked the outset of the military pullout of allies from South Vietnam. The 1969 Guam Theory supposed that Asian must be in the hand of Asian people.<sup>10</sup> It means the US would have an all-out military withdrawal in Asia. US military downsizes in both countries posed a threat to the security and economic landscape in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Consequently, South Vietnam and South Korea obligatorily seek another approach to ensure that internal forces had been guaranteed for anticommunism goal.

Despite this withdrawal, South Korea remained unbothered in economic cooperation with RVN with the hope of building a healthy environment for economic investment and encouraging the strategic presence of South Korea in Asia more profoundly. It can be seen as a result of American foreign policy changes during the Vietnam War. In 1970, Park Chung Hee’s government published a policy of diplomatic directions and stressed the establishment of economic cooperation office in Asia to expand its market and break any economic impediments. Especially, South Korea urged



to set up ASEAN - South Korea economic ties during this period and enthusiastically consulted with Asian countries to form a commercial office and make a significant contribution to their economic development.<sup>22</sup> It is recognized that the detachment of the South Korean Army in the Vietnam War was likely to cause a decline in US aid for this country while the bipolar order of international relations became more balanced in the context of the Sino-American concord. As a result, South Korea had a special intention of promoting its economic cooperation in Asia, which would bring a great economic advantage to South Korea's upcoming development of economy. The presence of South Korea in South Vietnam triggered a further vision of this bilateral tie, which drift away from the US's influence and reinforce the station of South Korea in this country once the US withdrew its troops from South Vietnam.

RVN contemplated a post-war policy scheme and underscored the role of the economic building to reconstruct the country and diminish the actions of Communists. In 1968, Tran Chanh Thanh - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RVN, concretized that the coherent foreign policies of the RVN were dissident to reject the world of Communism and located the RVN in the freedom world 1968.<sup>23</sup> In 1971, Tran Van Lam - Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to multi-faceted cooperation with its allies to bolster economic well-being and preserve the electoral regime, while Communists always seized this territory through resistance.<sup>24</sup> It is a significant alternative to protect RVN from a series of harsher attacks from Communism forces in South Vietnam. The demand for economic development was vital to defend the country. External cooperation was substantial to strengthen the power of RVN in the post-war period, along with the international support for the movements of South Vietnamese people after the pullout of America and its allies.

Hence, RVN-ROK Economic Cooperation Conference continued to be organized in Saigon from April 21 to April 25, 1970. The goal of

this conference was to have a close dialogue on South Korea's role in seaports and technical and commercial exchanges between the two countries. At this conference, Pham Kim Ngoc - Minister of Economy put stress on the post-war economic plan as soon as South Korean troops departed from Vietnam. Ngoc mainly gave his attention the role of irrigation in Go Cong (Tien Giang) and the training programs for agricultural staff in Vietnam through the support of South Korean experts.<sup>25</sup> The conference was held after the success of *Nguoi cay co ruong*, which appeased social conflicts in South Vietnam's rural areas and paved the way for economic growth in agriculture showed that RVN took great advantage of foreign attention to the national economy to attract a huge allocation and expert consultation to make an effective agricultural paradigm.

Besides, the achievement of the ROK in Samual Undong enlightened rural development plans of South Vietnam and expressed a wish to make South Vietnam - South Korea economic cooperation get a deeper level of cooperation. In the conference of annual RVN-ROK economic discussion in April 1970, agriculture and fishery ranked the first position in talks. The Director of the ROK Fisheries saw points of prospects of off-shore fishing and related industries, consisting of fishing boat construction, ice-making, cold storage, fish meal manufacturer, fishing net production, so he referred to this field to make a joint vision for the future of bilateral economic cooperation. Both parties approved of recommending that both government to step for, namely encouraging Korean and Vietnamese private sectors to meet and discuss on the possibility of a joint venture in off-shore fishing and related industries. The government of South Vietnam also concentrated on projects conducted by two sides, which performed enthusiasm of South Korea toward the potential of South Vietnam.<sup>26</sup> The government of South Korea was willing to entrust some groups of specialists in this field to consult with South Vietnamese



experts for sea-based development programs of post-war economic development plans of South Vietnam. Transparently seeing the enormity of agricultural cooperation, South Korea submitted to the government of South Vietnam a plan to renovate Go Cong Irrigation, drainage, and salinity control project. The investment of the ROK government in the agriculture of Vietnam was expected to turn it into a potential market for South Korea in Southeast Asia. The success of Samual Undong would fructify South Korea’s agriculture and the products were able to be transported outside to boost the value of export and earned more profit for South Korea’s economy.

Besides, two governments took note of the excellent technical and material support that the ROK government had provided to the RVN government in its vital agricultural development efforts and recognized the urgent need for Vietnamese technicians and farmers to have the use of Korean agricultural technics and farm machinery.<sup>26</sup> For instance, ROK dispatched South Korean agricultural engineers to be in consultation with South Vietnamese experts to enhance the quality of farming, integration, fertilizer usage, pest control, and adaptation testing of new varieties.

**Table 5.** Changes in the scale of dispatch of the Agricultural Technology Team<sup>27</sup>

<i>Years</i>	<i>Number of persons</i>
1967	18
1968	35
1969	35
1970	35
1971	30 - 40
1972	23 - 24
1973	16 - 20
1974	16 - 20
1975	17
Total	225 - 244

Table 5 illustrates that the number of agricultural technology teams in South Korea remained stable from 1967 to 1975. This aid helped make a synergy between South Vietnam and South Korea to establish an economic link in agriculture, which is an enormous benefit for the two countries. Shinji Lee stated that this is the first time, South Korea released a team to help a close friend renovate national agriculture and promote fishery and farming.

The RVN and the ROK government were geared to combine military support with civilian support. Despite extricating the troops from South Vietnam, the ROK inflated the significance of civilian support in South Vietnam. Evidently, two governments closely examined the cooperation of the ROK Army stationed in South Vietnam in implementing hydraulic works in the II Corps and in restoring the Hung Loc Agricultural Research Center.<sup>26</sup> South Korean experts had a closer analysis of residual prospects of South Vietnam when military capacity was diminished owing to the withdrawal of South Korean troops. Two governments made thorough deliberation on the possibility of having cooperation between the ROK Army stationed in Vietnam and the scheme of ROK government to restore Hung Loc Agricultural Research Center in Long Khanh province, near the Di An ROK Army Construction Support Group. During the involvement of South Korea, South Korean experts had a rich knowledge of agricultural potentials of this area. The decline of military engagement was antonymous to a surge of agricultural cooperation ideas. The government of South Korea obviously took another approach to retain economic interests in South Vietnam in place of an absolute engagement.

Furthermore, the government of Park Chung Hee was committed to continued assistance in Korea-supporting rural pacification and development programs by supplying with necessary commodities to support the two Improved Villages in Binh Dinh and Kien Giang Province as requested by South Vietnam.

The package also offered needed materials and equipment for hydraulic construction to support the small irrigation projects.<sup>26</sup> In other sectors, the government of Park conceded the proposal of Thieu's government to complete the packaged water treatment plant (\$110,000), commodities (30 groups consisting from \$400 to \$3000), 100 well sorcons of US\$100 for each, cylinder boring machine of US\$2000, crank-shart grindng machine of US\$2500, yard forklift of US\$3000, scholarship for training on water supply and sewerage system, and seven technicians to operate repair ship and to train Vietnamese laborers. Four Korean technicians continually did their occupation in South Vietnam.<sup>26</sup> A wealth of aid was duly reasonable amid impetuous attacks of Communists in rural areas and distorted information around the "Nguoi cay co ruong" (Peasants own their land) of Nguyen Van Thieu. As for Thieu, the aid of South Korea was a critical provision to ease burden of being subjected to the US aid and it was an initiative of the RVN to snatch a tremendous opportunity for reconstructing the country after the war. Both governments patched up with each other by providing a wide selection of scholarships in Fishery and Agriculture and short-term observation tours to succor South Vietnam with a wisdom development of national economy. As for South Korea, the market of South Vietnam was on par with an increase in export values and boost a planned economic presence in Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries. It could be considered a driving force to raise his reputation of Thieu and his success in rural areas in 1970. It can be argued that the 3<sup>rd</sup> session of the RVN-ROK annual economic conference marked a breakthrough in this relationship. The memorandum was signed by Tran Van Bot - Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Labor, Dinh Xuan Minh - special assistant to Minister of Health Committee, and Choi Kwang Soo- South Korean Deputy Director General, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shaping a fate of bilateral economic cooperation to an oomph of on-the-job training, vocational

improvement and vocational training in general for Vietnamese at Korean firms in Vietnam and of training the Vietnamese technicians in several arenas in Korea by these enterprises. Also, the two sides reached a mutual voice in expediting the issuance of work-permit to Korean workers in the case of rotation, extension, and re-entry as well as to the reemployment of high-skilled Korean employees in Vietnam in accordance with the demands of the indigenous manpower situation.<sup>26</sup> The success of this economic cooperation satisfied the urgency of the demands of South Vietnam to pay close attention to economic development in common with anticommunism containment. It built a norm of post-war vista, which alleged that South Vietnam stepped forward a modern capitalist operation under the paradigm of economic cooperation and diplomatic relation diversification.

Moreover, South Korea retained import and export activities with South Vietnam during the final years of the Vietnam War.

**Table 6.** 5 years of South Vietnam import status<sup>19</sup>

Year	South Vietnam's import (Unit: Thousand dollars)	Rate of changes (Unit: %)
1972	2212	37.2
1973	7620	244.5
1974	5208	-31.7
1975	551	-89.4
1976	0	-100

In the last year of the Vietnam War, the attack of Communists, along with cut-off aid from the US put RVN in a precarious position. Meanwhile, the South Vietnam market was quite considerable to South Korea. With the purpose of replacing the key role of the US in the Vietnam War with another approach, South Korea showed its vigorous support to aid South Vietnam. According to the data, the number of South Korean aid for South Vietnam gained 2212 thousand dollars in 1972 and three times increased in 1973 and got 7620 thousand dollars

in 1973. Despite a gradual decrease in aid, the number of 1975 was still profound at 551 thousand dollars. It is implied that ROK remained a robust economic relationship with RVN to build a security and cooperation sphere in Southeast Asia. While the involvement of South Korea in the Vietnam War caused a nightmarish story for the South Vietnamese people, this approach was expected to build a sense of reconnection and goodwill in South Korea to diminish the fear of South Korea’s presence in the war.

**Table 7.** Foreign investment capital until April 1974 (Unit: million dong)<sup>5</sup>

Capitalism elements	Total foreign investment of capital in economic fields	Foreign investment in industry	Percentage (%)
France	2446	1,734	70,89
Japan	1476	788	53,38
Taiwan	1066	135	12,66
America	1798,3	322	17,90
England	1050	1021,6	97,29
South Korea	<b>612,7</b>	<b>175,2</b>	<b>28,59</b>
Singapore	1193,6	261	21,86
Other	6561,7	1175,6	17,91

Table 7 illustrates the ranks of foreign investors in South Vietnam’s market. Data shows that South Korea’s foreign investment of capital in economic fields achieved 612,7 million VND, but this number was insignificant compared to other countries. The role of South Korea’s investment in South Vietnam still faced a harsh rivalry with other countries, especially America and France’s investment embarrassed South Korea’s economic effort to sway over South Vietnam’s market. However, it was not until the end of the Vietnam War that South Korea did not relegate its ambitions to maintain economic ties with South Vietnam, which can be deemed to be a prosperous market for South Korea’s investment. Also, it seems to be reasonable to state that South Korea did not have a disposition

toward Communism’s triumph in South Vietnam albeit the political landscape was advantageous to Communists to topple with the Saigon government. It would prove that Communism was achievable and South Korea would have a funk at a similar story to North Korea. The long-term economic presence of South Korea in South Vietnam’s market would frame the economic relationship in a peaceful way and an upbeat future for South Vietnam once the Paris Agreement was implemented legally and post-war plans would pave the way for the much higher investment in South Korea in Vietnam.

Generally, economic relations between RVN and ROK were an unequal process. While ROK considered South Vietnam as a benign market to allocate its huge investment, RVN expressed its stagnant stance to derive advantages from this cooperation. The import-based economy of RVN, which was featured by the war is a formidable impediment to turning it into an export country. Besides, the cutoff of US aid, along with a lack of a long-term economic plan was committed to the unstable national economy and triggered the fiasco of South Vietnam in 1975.

4. CONCLUSIONS

To summarize the research findings, it is undeniable that economic cooperation between South Vietnam and South Korea stems from mutual interests to diminish the adverse influence of Communism in the region.

The futility of this cooperation supported a dynamic development of the ROK’s economic international relations, which referred to the key element of export values to be in company with domestic industrialization plans to make a harmonious development for South Korea to softening the role of the US in South Korea’ economy. Besides, the aid of the US was ascribed to an intensive engagement of ROK’s Army in South Vietnam, which not only cemented strategic alliance with the US, but brought a considerable advantage for South Korea’

economy. Politically, economic ties with South Vietnam originated from the presidency of Rhee Syngman with bilateral agreements with the signature of the 1958 Treaty of Trade Relations. South Vietnam - South Korea bilateral economic cooperation became greater to legally facilitate the easy flow of money, commodities, and investments for South Korean soldiers in South Vietnam. As for South Vietnam, the involvement of South Korea's economy contributed to elevating the role of South Vietnam, an infantile country striving to assume political sovereignty over the world. The recognition of South Korea to economic agreements and ties with South Vietnam was committed to improving economic infrastructure of South Vietnam and South Vietnamese economists and policymakers were able to receive an ample experience to reconstruct the country from the severe war to peace time. South Vietnam and South Korea were in alignment to forge a long-term economic link as international economic cooperation was conducive to making a thriving economy for the war in South Vietnam.

However, it is no denying that the war highlighted the importance of military force, resultantly, the sphere of Realism blunted efforts of cooperation and development. In the climate of the Cold War, both South Korea and South Vietnam concentrated on vanquishing Communism, yet specific historical background of each country defined a path of construction. As for South Korea, peacetime after the Korean War facilitated South Korean economists and politicians to have more time to ruminate over economic rehabilitation. Meanwhile, South Vietnam underwent social and economic grievances due to its *bête noire*- Communists and absolutely allocated its time and dedication to the war to be against Communists. In addition, an about-turn of international relations after the withdrawal of the US posed a serious threat to the RVN while ROK was willing to stand aloof and aim of defeating Communism to acclimatize the Sino-American détente. Certainly, Park

contemplated a new policy, which disrespected Communism containment and had proclivity of another approach, which would inflate the significance of South Korea's economy as opposed to a sense of politics. After the decision of the Guam Theory, South Korea was grown by a grave apprehension of US military decline. Hence, the ROK government decided to incline the new foreign policy of the US, which guaranteed the ROK's economic benefits from the PRC in the future. Though the US simultaneously committed with South Vietnam and South Korea that it had a consistent presence in military and economic support for both two countries, Park Chung Hee did not rely on the US policy, and he expands a continued effort to keep its both political and economic involvement in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, the government of Thieu looked for a rosy picture of the RVN during the post-war time through remaining bilateral meetings with the ROK economic delegates to assist South Vietnam to resuscitate the country and make a stage for experience and expert exchanges for the economy. Despite insisting on a solid policy to both subdue the insurgencies of Communists and develop the country, South Vietnamese leaders found it arduous to have a grip on the attacks of Communists. It was an embattled government, which grappled with a series of problems, including military and financial retrenchment of allies sprung from political volte-face and a gravely threatening security atmosphere. Thereby, South Vietnamese politicians had a narrow opportunity to make a stronger connection with South Korea in economic cooperation.

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